DeepEDN: A Deep Learning-based Image Encryption and Decryption Network
  for Internet of Medical Things by Ding, Yi et al.
1DLEDNet: A Deep Learning-based Image
Encryption and Decryption Network for Internet of
Medical Things
Yi Ding, Member, IEEE, Guozheng Wu, Dajiang Chen, Member, IEEE, Ning Zhang, Senior Member, IEEE,
Linpeng Gong, Mingsheng Cao, Member, IEEE, and Zhiguang Qin, Member, IEEE
Abstract—With the rapid development of Internet of Medical
Things (IoMT) technology, many medical imaging equipments
are connected to the medical information network to facilitate
the process of diagnosing and treating for doctors. As medical
image contains sensitive information, it is of importance yet very
challenging to encrypt the medical image to safeguard the privacy
or security of the patient. In this work, a deep learning based
encryption and decryption network (DLEDNet) is proposed to
fulfill the process of encrypting and decrypting the medical image.
Specifically, in DLEDNet, the Cycle-GAN network is employed as
the main learning network to transfer the medical image from its
original domain to the target domain. Target domain is regarded
as a “Hidden Factors” to guide the learning model to realize
the encryption process. The encrypted image is restored to the
original (plaintext) image through a reconstruction network to
achieve an image decryption process. In order to realize the data
mining process direct from the privacy-protected environment, a
ROI (Region of interest)-mining-network is proposed to extract
the interested object directly from the encrypted image. The
proposed DLEDNet is evaluated on the chest X-ray dataset.
Extensive experimental results show that the proposed method
can achieve a high level of security with a good performance in
efficiency.
Index Terms—Image encryption, Deep learning, Medical image
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) is an interdis-
ciplinary filed which adopts the Internet of Things (IoT)
technologies in the domain of medicine [1]–[3]. With the
development of IoMT, many medical imaging equipments
are widely connected and used to facilitate the process of
diagnosing and treating for doctors, e.g., the brain magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) for brain tumor diagnosis and the
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computed tomography (CT) of lung for lung nodule detection.
In IoMT, medical images are usually managed by a system
called Picture Archiving and Communication Systems (PACS)
[4]. When a patient is scanned by the medical imaging equip-
ment, the generated medical images will be firstly stored into
the PACS. When the doctor begins to examine the patient, the
PACS will retrieve the needed images from the database and
transfer the images to the doctors’ workstation which works
with the patient information from the Hospital Information
System (HIS). Although the PACS and HIS works in an
intranet environment, there are still some serious security
issues for storing, transferring, reviewing medical images,
which preserve sensitive privacy information of patients. If
an attacker, either an internal or an external attacker, has the
ability to intrude the PACS or HIS, it becomes much easy to
eavesdrop these medical images, resulting in severe privacy
information leak of patients [5]–[7].
To safeguard the IoMT systems and protect the patients’
privacy, encryption and decryption approaches can be adopted
on medical images, e.g., Data Encryption Standard (DES), Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) and the Hash Function [8],
[9]. In addition, image encryption based on chaotic systems are
also employed in the literature [10]. However, these methods
are hard to achieve a good balance between the security
performance and the encryption efficiency. Deep learning also
draw great attentions to tackle the problem, which refers to
multi-layer neural networks to extract a hierarchy of features
from raw input images. The Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) [11], [12] has demonstrated the significant advantages
in computer vision tasks [13]–[16] as well as in image domain
transfer [17], [18]. Transferring the image from one domain
onto another can be considered as a problem of texture
transfer where the goal is to learn the mapping relationship
between an input image and an output image from a set
of aligned image pairs. One of the most popular image-to-
image translation method is the Cycle-Consistent Adversarial
Networks [19], which introduces two cycle consistency losses
that transform the image from one domain to the other, and
then reconstruct back to the original image. In fact, the deep
learning algorithm has also been adopted to solve the problem
of image denoising [20]. Image noise refers to the interference
information existing in image data, resulting in some useful
image information becomes invisible. The image denoising
process can be regarded as the image restoration [21].
Inspired by the above works, in this work, a deep learning
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2Fig. 1. The architecture of DLEDNet.
based image encryption and decryption network (DLEDNet)
is proposed by leveraging deep learning techniques for image-
to-image translation and image denoising. The novel idea is
based on the following two important insights: (1) If the
medical image can be transferred into other image domain
which is greatly different from the original one, this medical
image can be regarded as encrypted; and (2) the medical
image decryption process can be implemented in the manner
of image denoising or image reconstruction. In DLEDNet, the
Cycle-Gan network is employed as the main learning network
to implement the image-to-image translation. There are two
domains in the encryption process: the original medical image
domain and the target domain, where the target domain is
regarded as a “Hidden Factors” to guide the learning model to
realize the encryption process. For the encryption network, it
consists of a generation network and a discriminator network.
The former will generate the image similar to the target
domain, while the latter will promote the generation network
to generate the same images as the target domain by identi-
fying the generated images. Therefore, after processing using
the encryption network, the original medical image can be
converted into the target domain and becomes the ciphertext.
The decryption process is similar to traditional encryption-
decryption methods, which is the inverse operation of the
encryption process. In practice, a reconstruction network,
which is actually a decryption procedure, is used to restore
the encrypted image to the original one. In DELDNet, the
parameters of generation network is regarded as the privacy
key for encryption while the parameters of reconstruction net-
work is regarded as the privacy key for decryption. Moreover,
DELDNet adopts the unsupervised learning method to train
the learning network and it doesn’t need a lot of labeled
samples. It overcomes the dataset problem in network training
and is beneficial to the application of deep learning algorithm
in cryptography filed.
Based on DLEDNet, the current PACS system is improved
by employing a key generation server. As shown in Fig.1,
the key generation server was in charge of training the
encryption network and the decryption network as mentioned
before for later use. The PACS system can call the encryption
network to encrypt the medical image obtained from the
medical imaging equipment and then store these ciphertext
images into the image database. When a doctor wants to
review the medical image, the HIS system will retrieve the
specified ciphertext image from the PACS server and adopts
the decryption network to decrypt the ciphertext image to the
original one before transmitting to the doctor’s workstation.
The encryption network and the decryption network will be
transferred with the secure channel in the hospital information
system. Moreover, in most cases, the doctor only needs
the interested organ or tissue instead of the whole medical
image. In order to effectively obtain the desired information,
a ROI-mining-network is proposed to directly extract the ROI
(organ or tissue) from the encrypted medical image without
decryption. Since the deep learning algorithm can extract the
useful information from the noisy images, the proposed ROI-
mining-network can be implemented by adopting the deep
learning algorithm. More specific, when inputting an encrypted
medical image into the ROI-mining-network, the interested
segmentation object can be directly extracted without revealing
other parts of the patient’s information.
In a nutshell, the main contributions of this work are
summarized as follows:
1. An novel medical image encryption and decryption
network, DLEDNet, is developed to realize the encipherment
process by applying the deep learning in the field of image-
3to-image translation. The proposed encryption method is with
the large key space, one-time pad, and be sensitive to key
change. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first
work to attempt to adopt the deep learning method in the area
of medical image encryption.
2. A ROI-mining-network is proposed to directly extract
the interested segmentation region from the encrypted medical
image instead of decrypting the ciphertext image firstly. From
to the experiments, it can be found that the proposed approach
can realize the data mining process directly from the privacy-
protected environment.
3. Extensive experiments are conducted on the chest Xray
dataset to evaluate the proposed DLEDNet. The results demon-
strate that the medical image can be transmitted with a
high level of security and efficiency, compared with existing
medical image encryption methods. Moreover, the proposed
encryption algorithm can resist various attacks, even if the
attacker has known the complete process for key generation.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Medical Image Encryption
In the literature, there are many approaches proposed for
image encryption [22]–[24]. Lima et al [22] propose a novel
scheme for encryption of medical images, based on the cosine
number transform, which is a mathematical tool requiring
modular arithmetic only. This property avoids rounding-off
errors and allows that the image recovered after the en-
cryption/decryption process is identical to the corresponding
original image. The proposed scheme is flexible and can be
applied to images complying with the DICOM standard, which
is frequently employed in medical applications. Natsheh et
al [23] propose a simple and effective encryption approach
for for multi-frame DICOM medical images. It can reduce
the encryption and decryption time of these images by using
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Mukhedkar et al [24]
demonstrate that image encryption can be done using Blowfish
Algorithm as it is faster and LSB technique is used for image
hiding.
Chaotic maps have the characteristics of pseudo-
randomness, ergodicity and initial value sensitivity. Chaotic
sequences generated by chaotic maps have good characteristics
of security keys. Chaotic cryptography has gradually become
a new research direction of cryptography. Medical image
encryption can also be performed using chaotic maps. Kanso
et al [25] propose a novel full and selective chaos-based image
encryption scheme suitable for medical image encryption.
The proposed approach consists of several rounds, where
each round has two phases: a shuffling phase and a masking
phase. Both phases are block-based and use chaotic cat
maps to shuffle and mask an input image. Chong et al [26]
present a novel chaos-based medical image encryption
scheme which introduces a substitution mechanism in the
permutation process through a bit-level shuffling algorithm
in order to improve the efficiency. In order to protect
image effectively, Yu et al [27] present an image encryption
algorithm based on wavelet function and four-dimension
chaotic system. The algorithm firstly uses Wavelet function
chaotic maps to scramble the image pixel location, and then
use four-dimension chaotic system disturbs image pixel value.
B. Image-to-Image Transfer by Generative Adversarial Net-
works
Since the seminal work by Goodfellow et al [28] in 2014,
a series of GAN-based methods have been proposed for a
wide variety of applications. The original GAN can learn a
generator to capture the distribution of real data by introducing
an adversarial discriminator that evolves to discriminate the
difference between the real data and the fake data [28]. GAN-
based methods can produce state-of-the-art results in many
applications such as image generation [29], image segmenta-
tion [30], image super-resolution [31], and image-to-image
translation [37] [38].
Yi et al [40] use a conditional generative adversarial net-
work to learn a mapping from input to output images. It is
proved that this approach is effective on synthesizing photos
from label maps, reconstructing objects from edge maps, and
colorizing images. DualGAN [39] mechanism enables image
translators to be trained from two sets of unlabeled images.
Taking two sets of unlabeled images as the input, DualGAN
simultaneously learns two reliable image translators from one
domain to the other and hence can facilitate a wide variety of
image-to-image translation tasks. CycleGAN proposed in [19]
is a framework to perform image translation with unpaired
training data. To achieve this goal, it trains two sets of GAN
models at the same time, mapping from class A to class B and
from class B to class A, respectively. The loss is formulated
based on the combined mapping that maps images to the same
class. The key to GANs’ success is the idea of an adversarial
loss that forces the generated images to be distinguishable
from target images. The adversarial loss is used to learn the
mapping of the original images to the “target domain images”
which represents the Image-to-Image translation.
Regardless of their merits, these algorithms are difficult to
achieve a good balance between the security and the efficiency.
On the one hand, as there is plenty of information in a single
medical image with high correlation among these information,
when encrypting the medical image, the block encryption
algorithm is with low efficiency and cannot meet the real-
time requirement. On the other hand, the chaotic system
usually adopts the one-dimensional chaotic map to generate
pseudorandom sequences. Consequently, the chaotic system
tends to be easy to analyze and predict through a nonlinear
prediction method based on phase-space reconstruction [40].
The deep learning algorithm has been used in the security
field [41]–[43]. However, there is no work on the medical
image encryption and decryption.
In this paper, deep learning techniques are used to encrypt
and decrypt medical images, in which parameters of the deep
learning network model are regarded as the encryption and
decryption keys. Due to the large key space and the complex
model structure, the proposed method can achieve a high level
of security with a high efficiency.
4Fig. 2. The overall framework of DLEDNet.
III. ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION NETWORK
A. Architecture of DLEDNet
As shown in Fig.2, DLEDNet mainly consists of three sub-
networks: the encryption network G, the discriminator network
D, and the decryption network F. The encryption network G
is used to encrypt the original input images, the decryption
network F is responsible for restoring the encrypted images to
the original one (decrypting the image), and the discriminator
network D is mainly designed for improving the encryption
performance of the encryption network by distinguishing be-
tween the generated encrypted generated encryption images
and the images in target domain (Hiding factors). In deep
learning methods, loss function is usually used to train the
model. The overall loss L of the proposed model is given as
follows:
L = LG + LD + Lreconstruction (1)
Where the LG indicates the loss of the encryption network
G, LD indicates the loss of the discriminator network D, and
Lreconstruction indicates the loss of the decryption network F.
1) Encryption Network and Decryption Network: Fig.??
shows the explicit structure structure of the encryption network
G, which is used to transform the input medical images into in
target domain for medical image encryption. The G network
begins with an initial convolution stage to spatially compress
and encode the images, and the useful features extracted in this
stage will be used for the following transformation. Then there
are nine nine residual blocks similar to the residual block of
[44], and combine with identical layout with identical layout to
construct the content and manifold features. The output images
are reconstructed by two up-convolution blocks which contain
a strided convolutional layer and the stride is set to 2. Finally,
the prediction is exported by a 7×7 convolution kernel. In
addition, the structure of decryption network F is the same as
the encryption network G.
The proposed model includes two mappings G : X → Y
and F : Y → X . The goal of mapping function G is to
learn how to transform the original medical images X into the
images Y in target domain, and trick the discriminator network
D. When the discriminator network D cannot successfully
distinguish whether an image is generated by the encryption
network G or a real ciphertext image domain Y , it means that
the encryption network G convert the original patient image
domain X into a ciphertext image domain Y successfully. The
loss LG of the encrypted network G is:
LG = minG(Ex∼pdata(x)log(1−D(G(x))), (2)
where G represents an encryption network, and D represents
the discriminator network. The loss of G is to minimize the
success rate of the discriminator network D in detecting the
ciphertext generated by the encryption network G. In addition
to the encryption, another goal of the proposed method is to
ensure that the restored image reserves the texture information
of the original one even it is encrypted. As shown in Fig.2,
for each image x from domain X , the reconstruction loss
measures the difference between G(x) and the original image,
i.e., x → G(x) → F (G(x)) ≈ x. The reconstruction loss L
defined as:
Lreconstruction = Ex∼pdata(x) ||Y −X||1
= Ex∼pdata(x)
n∑
i=1
|yi − xi|
= Ex∼pdata(x)(|y1 − x1|+ ...+ |yi − xi|)
(3)
2) Discriminator Network: The discriminator network D is
used to check whether the output image of encryption network
belongs to the target domain. For the discriminator network
D, after initial convolutional layers, the network employs
two strided convolutional blocks to reduce the resolution of
image and encode essential local features for subsequential
discrimination. Then, a feature construction block and a 3×3
convolutional layer are used to obtain the final result. Besides,
for each convolutional layer, the Leaky ReLU (LReLU) with
α = 0.2 is adopted and followed with a batch normalization
(BN) layer.
The training of the discriminator network D is to classify
the images and determine whether it comes from the ciphertext
domain Y or is generated by the encryption network G. The
encryption network G attempts to generate an images G(x)
similar to the image in domain Y , while the discriminator
network D aims to find the difference between translated
samples from G(x) and real samples in y. The loss LD of
the discriminator network D can be regarded as maximizing
of the classification accuracy of the discriminator network D,
which is opposite to the goal of the encryption network G is
described as follows:
LD = Ex∼pdata(x)logD(x) + Ex∼pdata(x)log(1−D(G(x)))
(4)
Where G represents the encrypted network, and D represents
the discriminator network. The LD and LG in the GAN net-
work form a adversarial relationship. When the two networks
reach an equilibrium state, the discriminator network D can
achieve 50% classification accuracy for both the ciphertext
image generated and the real ciphertext domain image Y . In
other words, the ciphertext image generated by the encryption
5network G is very similar to the real ciphertext domain Y so
that the discriminator network D cannot distinguish them.
3) The key generation process: In DLEDNet, the final
parameters of network G can be considered as the privacy key
for encryption while the parameters of network F are regarded
as the privacy key for decryption. The process of generating
the privacy key is as follows: For encryption, the parameters
for each convolutional layer are firstly randomly initialized as
follows:
Wn = random[wn,1, wn,2, ..., wn,j , ...], (5)
where wn is the nth convolutional layer and wn,j is the
j-th parameter of one convolutional layer. Therefore, the
privacy key W for encryption is actually composed of all
the parameters of each convolutional layer, and is defined as
follows:
W = consist[W1,W2, ...,Wn, ...] (6)
When training the encryption network, the privacy key for
encryption is continuously updated and refined with different
input images through forward propagation training process.
The adversarial loss Lgan is calculated to measure the differ-
ence between the predicted result and the target in “Hidden
Factors”, thereby guiding the network to train and update the
privacy key for encryption.
Except for the forward propagation, the back-propagation
algorithm (BP) is also employed to pass loss of the entire
network between the convolutional layers. It is actually a
gradient descent, which can further update the parameters in
each layer to achieve better performance. The gradient descent
can be described as:
θj = θj − α ∨ J(θ)
= θj − α δ
θj
J(θ)
= θj − α δ
θj
1
2m
m∑
i=1
(hθ(x
i)− yi)2
= θj − α 1
2m
m∑
i=1
δ
θj
(hθ(x
i)− yi)2
= θj − α 1
2m
m∑
i=1
2
δ
θj
(hθ(x
i)− yi)( δ
θj
(hθ(x
i)− yi))
= θj − α 1
m
m∑
i=1
(hθ(x
i)− yi)× (
n∑
i=0
δ
θi
θixi − δ
θi
yi)
= θj − α 1
m
m∑
i=1
(hθ(x
i)− yi)
× ( δ
θi
(θ0x0 + θ1x1 + ...+ θnxn)− δ
θi
yi)
(7)
Where θj is the value of parameter θ in the jth training epoch.
The α is the learning rate and ∨J(θ) means the gradient that
pass back to the convolution layer θ in the jth training epoch.
The generation process of the privacy key for decryption
is similar to the process of generating the privacy key for en-
cryption, except that the initial input of the decryption network
becomes the predicted result of the encryption network. In
addition, the loss of decryption network is the reconstruction
loss, which is given in Equ. (8).
Lreconstruction = Ex∼pdata(x) ||F (P (X))−O(X)||1
= Ex∼pdata(x)
n∑
i=1
|F (P (xi))−O(xi)|
= Ex∼pdata(x)(|F (P (x0))−O(x0)|
+ ...+ |F (P (xi))−O(xi)|)
(8)
where F () is the decryption network, P (x) is the pixel x in
the predicted image, and O(x) is the corresponding position
pixel x in the original image. The encryption network G and
the decryption network F are trained in an alternative manner.
When the loss becomes stable, the final parameters (privacy
keys) for encryption and decryption network can be obtained.
The complete privacy key generation process is shown in
Fig.3.
After obtaining the key, the patient’s medical image can be
encrypted by the encryption network G, and then decrypted
by the decryption network F. The proposed medical image
encryption/decryption algorithm is given in Alg. 8.
Algorithm 1 Image Encryption/Decryption.
Initialization: Digitize the 255×255 image into a 255×255
matrix X0∗.And then enter it into our 21-layer(Lc) encryp-
tion/decryption model.
1: while L< Lc do
2: for all element (XL1 , XL2 ,...) in matrix XL do
3: Each pre-trained 3×3 convolution kernel WL∗ in
Lth layer sequentially traverses the image matrix and
multiplies it with the corresponding elements of the
matrix(WL∗×XL∗ ).
4: Add the obtained nine W∗X∗ to get a new pre-
dicted value XL+1∗ in (L+1)
th.
5: Collect all XL+1 and combine them into a new
matrix to form the next-level feature matrix.
6: end for;
7: L = L+ 1;
8: end while
Output: Convert the last layer of matrix XLc into an image
to get the final encrypted/decrypted image.
Since the GAN model is highly nonlinear and randomly
initialized, and the parameters of the learning network can be
totally different at different training times. In other words, the
GAN network is unstable, which is its weakness when used for
computer vision tasks. However, this instability has advantages
for cryptography. By utilizing this instability, the proposed
deep learning based encryption method can be regarded as
an one-Time Pad (OTP) method. Specifically, the parameters
of encryption network are totally different after training the
network at different times. Overall, due to the depth and
complex structure of the learning / encryption network, the
proposed framework has higher security.
B. ROI Mining Network in Ciphertext Environments
Although various methods have achieved a good perfor-
mance in protecting the image privacy, it is still very challeng-
6Fig. 3. The key generation process.
ing to directly obtain the effective information in a ciphertext
environment, such as extracting the desired ROI from the en-
crypted medical image. In DLEDNet, a ROI-mining-network
is proposed to segment the region of interest from the en-
crypted medical image. An overview of the network structure
of the ROI-mining-network is shown in Fig. 8, in which the
backbone is the ResNet-50 [32]. In order to extract useful
texture features in a ciphertext environment, a deeper network
structure is adopted to learn semantic features to accurately
segment the specific target. The input encrypted image will be
processed with 5 blocks, and each block has a down-sampling
convolution. In the first block, since the convolutional kernel
size is set to 3×3, each convolution operation can learn the
local information from the input image. As the depth of the
network increases, more abstracted semantic information can
be obtained. Finally, by combining the output results from each
convolution layer, the final prediction results can be obtained.
Each block in ResNet-50 has two sub-blocks. One is the
identity (ID) block in which the stride of each convolution
layer is 1. The identity block is mainly used to extract
abstract features through multi-layer convolution. Because the
dimensions of the input and output are the same, these feature
maps can be connected serially. The other basic block is
Conv Block where the dimensions of input and output are
different and it is used to change the dimension of the feature
vector and to resize feature size through a strided convolutional
layer. The CNN-based neural network commonly converts the
image into a small feature map with many channels. However,
with the increasing of the network layers, there will be a
huge number of output channels and parameters, resulting
in increased computational complexity and reduced network
efficiency. Therefore, it is necessary to reduce the dimension
of Conv Block before processing with the Identity Block.
In DLEDNet, the proposed ROI-mining-network is used
to implement the medical image segmentation task in the
ciphertext environment. The medical image segmentation is a
7critical step in medical image analysis. Its purpose is to extract
useful features and segment the doctors’ interested objects.
The segmentation results can provide a reliable basis for
clinical diagnosis and pathological research. When training the
ROI-mining-network, the encrypted medical image is first used
as the input of the network. Then, the pixel-level segmentation
labels in the corresponding medical image are adopted to
supervise the training process. Finally, the model parameters
are updated by the mean square error (MSE). The loss function
of this segmentation model is described as:
Lsegment =
1
N
N∑
i=0
(groundi − predicti)2 (9)
where the groundi represents the value of the ith pixel in the
label and the predicti is the predicted value of the ith pixel in
the predicted result. N represents the total number of pixels
in this image. The final training result is a high-quality splitter
that can segment the medical images without decryption.
The usage of the ROI-mining-network is of great signif-
icance for medical image security. It can implement data
mining in an untrusted environment to securely extract specific
objects, which is also beneficial for protecting the privacy
patient. This network can further improve the security of
medical image analysis and can be widely used in many
medical applications.
C. Adversary Model
In DLEDNet, the most important factors of key generation
process include the structure of the model and the chosen
hidden factors. If the network structure or hidden factors leaks,
the attacker can train a similar encryption network by imitating
the privacy key generation process so as to crack the ciphertext
image. This kind of attack is called as the imitation learning
attack. This paper proposes three possible adversary models
for imitation learning attack: the hidden factors leakage, the
network architecture leakage, and both the hidden factors and
the network architecture leakage.
1) Hidden Factors Leakage: Hidden factors leakage means
that the attacker has known the hidden factors used for the
encryption, and tries to employ the same hidden factors to train
the attacking network with several different network architec-
tures to decrypt the ciphertext image. There are two encryption
and decryption networks with different network structures: the
encryption/decryption network A and encryption/decryption
network B. These two encryption and decryption networks are
trained with the same hiding factor. If the decryption network
B is able to recover the image encrypted by the encryption
network A, it means that the attacker can crack the secure key
by imitation learning attack.
2) Network Architecture Leakage: Network architecture
leakage assumes that only the architecture of the encryption
and decryption network is leaked, and the hidden factors
remains confidential. In this adversary model, the attacker can
decrypt the encrypted image by training the same network
structure without knowing the hidden factors. The attacker
can employ different hidden factors to train the same network
structure to construct different decryption networks. If the
Fig. 4. The same image is encrypted with the key obtained from four
networks.
attacker is able to recover the encrypted ciphertext image, the
attack is successful.
3) Both Hidden Factors and Network Architecture Leak-
age: The strongest adversary model is that both the net-
work architecture and hidden factors are leaked. In such a
scenario, the attacker can train the network with the same
network structure and hidden factor adopted for training
the encryption/decryption network. To prevent such attacks,
after each training of the network, the parameters of the
encryption/decryption network representing the actual private
key must be completely different. It means that the proposed
encryption algorithm should be similar to the OTP and can be
regarded as a chaotic encryption algorithm.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In DLEDNet, both encryption and decryption network are
constructed with 24 layers and the number of the parameters
for each network is 2,757,936. The explicit specification
of the network are shown in Table I. And for the ROI-
mining-network, a deeper resnet-50 architecture is adopted.
The network structure of the ROI-mining-network is given in
Table II. The dataset is the chest x-rays [45]. The proposed
method is running on the Nvidia GTX 2080Ti. When training
the network, it takes around 10 mins for each epoch of the
model.
A. Key Security Analysis
The ideal encryption scheme has the following characteris-
tics: 1) the key space is large enough so that it can effectively
resist the exhaustive attack under the premise of the existing
computing power; 2) the key generated for each time should be
different, i.e., the key generation should be uniform at random;
and 3) the encrypted image must be highly sensitive to the
key. The security of the key will be analyzed from these three
characteristics in the following sections.
1) Key Space Analysis: The size of the key space de-
termines the difficulty of an attacker using an exhaustive
attack. In this work, the key space of the proposed encryption
algorithm is the number of parameters for the deep learning
network, with a total of 2,757,936 parameters in the exper-
iments. Each parameter or key is a floating point number
between 0 and 1, which is 32 bits in the computer and
can be expressed as a decimal number with 10 significant
digits. Therefore, the key space of the encryption model can
be expressed as the (1010)2757936. It becomes very hard for
attackers to break down and can effectively resist attacks.
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THE STRUCTURE OF ENCRYPTED NETWORK AND DECRYPTION NETWORK.
Convolution Layer Name Number Size Input Channels Output Channels Parameters Total Parameters
Down Convolution1 1 7×7 3 32 4704 4704
Down Convolution2 1 3×3 32 64 18432 23136
Down Convolution3 1 3×3 64 128 73728 95864
Residual Blocks 18 3×3 128 128 2564208 2661072
Up Convolution1 1 3×3 128 64 73728 2734800
Up Convolution2 1 3×3 64 32 18432 2753232
Up Convolution3 1 7×7 32 3 4704 2757936
TABLE II
THE STRUCTURE OF ROI-MINING-NETWORK.
Convolution Layer Name Number Size Input Channels Output Channels Parameters Total Parameters
Block 1 2 7×7 3 64 4704 4704
Block 2 3 3×3 64 256 18432 23136
Block 3 12 3×3 256 512 73728 95864
Block 4 18 3×3 512 1024 2564208 2661072
Block 5 1 3×3 1024 2048 73728 2734800
2) Key Randomness Analysis: The encryption network is
trained four times with the same settings. Accordingly, the
parameters of these four networks are adopted as encryption
keys, i.e., Key A, Key B, Key C and Key D, respectively.
The same image is encrypted with these four keys, and the
encrypted images are shown in Fig. 11. Fig. 4(a), Fig. 4(b),
Fig. 4(c), and Fig. 4(d) are the results obtained by encrypting
the same original image from four networks. It is clear that
these four images are different. The similarity among these
four encrypted images (SSIM) are calculated, and the result
can be found in Table III. The SSIM index between different
images is mostly lower than 0.1 which indicates that the
similarity between different images is very low.
According to the experiment, it can be found that since
parameters of the neural network are randomly initialized, the
privacy keys for the medical image encryption network are
totally different after every training. These difference results in
different encrypted images which are processed with different
encryption networks. The idea behind this is the training of
the deep learning network is not stable. Different initialized
parameters can lead to various final parameters in different
training. It can be demonstrated that the proposed method
is similar to OTP and can be regarded as one type of OTP
method.
TABLE III
SSIM BETWEEN TWO ENCRYPTED IMAGES.
Image A B C D
a 1 0.07 0.11 0.09
b 0.07 1 0.08 0.04
c 0.11 0.08 1 0.05
d 0.09 0.04 0.05 1
3) Key Sensitivity Analysis: Unlike traditional encryption
algorithms, the error in deep learning models will be propa-
gated among layers. In the convolution process, the lth pixel
in the N th layer feature map is passed to a neighboring pixel
of the (N +1)th layer via a 3×3 convolution kernel. When a
feature point is erroneous, it will be passed to the 3×3 feature
points in the next layer. As the depth of the convolutional
network increases, the error of feature points will increase
with two pixels for each laye. In the up-sampling process,
this error increases exponentially with the superposition of the
deconvolution operation. The experiment assumes the attacker
knows the most privacy keys. And only about 5% of key
parameters are modified which is regarded as the unknown
part. Then, the encrypted image is input to the network with
new parameters, the network cannot decrypt the ciphertext
image to the original one. It means that even if only 5% of
the parameters is changed, the privacy key cannot encrypt
or decrypt the medical image correctly. In other words, it
becomes very hard for attackers to guess at least 95% of the
right key parameters in a key space with (1010)2757936 so as
to break the proposed algorithm.
B. Ciphertext Security Analysis
1) Histogram Analysis: To evaluate the performance of the
proposed encryption network, The original image is shown
in Fig. 5(a) and the encrypted image is shown in Fig. 5(c).
Through the experiment, it can be found that the pixel dis-
tribution of the original image and the encrypted image is
very different. In Fig. 5, the pixel histogram of the original
chest X-ray image has a total of 57600*(240 * 240) pixels
(Fig. 5(b)), in which more than 30,000 pixels have a value
of 0, and more than 5000 pixels have a value of 255. The
pixel distribution of original image is relatively concentrated.
However, the distribution of encrypted medical images (Fig.
5(d)) is more uniform, which is helpful for mitigating the
statistical analysis.
2) Entropy Analysis: The information entropy of the en-
crypted image is regarded as the effective quantitative mea-
surement for algorithms to against statistical attacks. The
image information entropy represents the statistical feature
of the grayscale distribution of the image. In an ideal case,
the encrypted image should be similar with random noise, the
grayscale distribution tends to be uniform, and the expected
9value should be 8. The information entropy formula is defined
as follows:
Entropy = −
N∑
l=0
p(l)log2(p(l)) (10)
where N is the number of gray levels of the pixel value
and p(l) is the probability that the pixel value l appears. The
entropy metric is calculated on the encrypted medical image,
and the results are shown in Table IV. It is clear that the image
encrypted by the proposed method is close to the ideal value of
8 on information entropy. Experiments show that the images
encrypted by the proposed method has the ability to resist the
statistical attacks.
TABLE IV
EVALUATION OF THE ENTROPY EFFECT OF OUR NETWORK.
Image Id 1 2 3 4 5
Entropy 7.96 7.96 7.95 7.94 7.95
Image Id 6 7 8 9 10
Entropy 7.97 7.95 7.96 7.96 7.95
C. Security Analysis under Different Adversary Models
The experiments are conducted to validate whether an
attacker can generate a key under three different adversary
models.
1) ‘Hidden Factors Leakage: In this experiment, four dif-
ferent network structures are considered, namely network A,
network B, network C and network D. The training condi-
tions are kept the same. The network structure of these four
networks are shown in Table V.
TABLE V
THE NETWORK MODEL OF THE DIFFERENT ARCHITECTURES.
Convolution Layer Net. A Net. B Net. C Net. D
Down Convolution1 1 1 1 1
Down Convolution2 1 1 1 1
Down Convolution3 1 1 1 1
Residual Blocks 18 15 12 9
Up Convolution1 1 1 1 1
Up Convolution2 1 1 1 1
Up Convolution3 1 1 1 1
The original image is encrypted by using the trained net-
work A. The ciphertext image is then decrypted by the decryp-
tion network obtained from network A, network B, network
C and network D respectively to restore the original image.
As shown in Fig.6, the original image (Fig.6(a)) encrypted by
network A (the encrypted image is shown in Fig.6(b)), can
only be correctly decrypted by the decryption network A as
shown in Fig.6(c). While the image decrypted by network B,
network C and network D are visually unrecognizable and
the result is shown in Fig.6(d), Fig.6(e), Fig.6(f), respectively.
Experiments show that even if the attacker knows the hidden
factors, the “attack network” trained with different network
structure still cannot be used to decrypt the ciphertext image.
Fig. 5. Pixel distribution of the original image and the encrypted image.
Fig. 6. The decryption performance for different networks.
2) Network Architecture Leakage: In this experiment, dif-
ferent hidden factors are adopted to train the encryption net-
work with the same network structure. All training conditions
are kept the same. As shown in Fig.7(a) and Fig.7(b), two dif-
ferent domain images (“Hidden Factors A” and “Hidden Fac-
tors B”) are chosen as hidden factors to train the network with
the same architecture. The Fig.7(c) is original image, Fig.7(d)
is the image generated by the encrypted network which is
trained by “Hidden Factors A”, and Fig.7(e) presents the result
of decrypting ciphertext image through the decryption network
trained with “Hidden Factors B”. From the experiment, it can
be found that the image generated by the encrypted network
which is trained by “Hidden Factors A” cannot be decrypted
by the network trained by “Hidden Factors B”. Therefore,
it can be proven that the “attack network” with the same
architecture trained by different hidden factors, cannot be used
to decrypt the ciphertex image with each other. That is, even
if attackers obtain the network architecture, they cannot train
the decryption network to decrypt the encrypted image without
knowing the hidden factors.
3) Both Hidden Factors and Network Architecture Leakage:
In this experiment, the network is trained with four times
under the same hidden factors and training conditions to get
the networks A, B, C and D, respectively. The experiment
evaluates the decryption performance for these four networks
on the same ciphertext image to verify whether the parameters
generated for each network are different. As shown in Fig.11,
the gray value distribution of the image decrypted by the
decryption key B, the decryption key C, and the decryption
key D is completely different from the image decrypted by the
decryption key A. It can be clearly found that under the same
training condition, the encrypted medical image encrypted by
one network, cannot be decrypted by adopting the parameters
in other network. Even if the model parameters are trained with
the same network architecture and the same hidden factors,
they cannot be used to decrypt the image with each other.
Experiments show that even if both the network architecture
and the hidden factors are leaked, and training the network
under the same training conditions, the parameters of each
network are totally different, i.e., the secure keys are different.
It can be proven that DLEDNet is secure even if the network
architecture and hidden factors are revealed.
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Fig. 7. The mutual decryption performance between networks under different
hidden factors training.
Fig. 8. The decryption performance for these four networks on the same
ciphertext image.
D. Security Analysis under Different Attack Models
1) Ciphertext Only Attack: In this type of attack, the
attacker has access to a string of ciphertext, but cannot access
to the corresponding plaintext.
In DLEDNet, the key space of the encryption model can
be expressed as (1010)2757936 and it is very hard for attacker
to break down. At the same time, the privacy key generated
with multiple iterations and diffusions is complex. Therefore,
it is difficult to crack the ciphertext through ciphertext only
attacks.
2) Known Plaintext Attack: In this type of attack, the
attacker knows a string of plaintext, and the corresponding
ciphertext. The attacker will try to decrypt the rest of the
ciphertext by using these known information.
In traditional sequential pixel visiting pattern methods, con-
crete encryption factors are generally retrieved as equivalent
keys for recovering the received ciphertexts. Taking XOR
encryption as an example, the masks calculated directly from
plaintext and ciphertext are sufficient to decode the ciphertext.
Typically, masks sequentially correspond to the plain pixels
and the retrieved masks by plaintext attack can be directly used
to decrypt other ciphertexts. However, the proposed algorithm
adopted the non-sequential encryption mechanism. Without
the knowledge of the pixel visiting pattern, the privacy key
cannot be obtained by the attacker, thus making plaintext
attack infeasible. The proposed algorithm adopts the iteration
and diffusion procedures to generate the privacy key. These
kinds of producers can significantly promote the security
performance and thus provide additional immunity of the
cipher against known plaintext attack.
3) Chosen Plaintext Attack: In this type of attack, the
attacker can access the encryption device, choose a string of
plaintext and construct its corresponding ciphertext string.
Generally, an attacker can observe the change of the ci-
phertext image by making small changes to the plaintext
image, such as changing the value of only one pixel of the
ciphertext, so as to obtain the connection between the plaintext
image and the ciphertext image. This type of attack is called
as differential attack which is a kind of chosen plaintext
attack method. If a small change in the plaintext image can
cause a huge change in the ciphertext image, this differential
attack method usually fails to take effect. It indicates that the
encryption algorithm can resist this chosen plaintext attack
method. Here, the Number of Pixel Change Rate (NPCR)
is adopted to measure the degree of image changing. NPCR
refers to the rate of pixels change which indicates the ratio
of different pixel values at the same position between two
plaintext/ciphertext images. The definition of NPCR is as
follows:
NPCR =
∑W
i=0
∑H
j=0D(i, j)
W ×H (11)
where W and H are the width and height of the image,
respectively. T1 and T2 represent a ciphertext image obtained
by encrypting two different plaintext images, respectively. If
T1(i, j) = T2(i, j), D(i, j) = 1. If T1(i, j) 6= T2(i, j),
D(i, j) = 0. In the experiment, there is only about 1%
different pixels between these two plaintext images. Both the
original plaintext image and the plaintext image with 1%
pixel value changed are input to the proposed encryption
model. Then, the NPCR is used to compare the differences
between these two encrypted images. The calculated average
NPCR value is 94.21%, which means that the information
of the plaintext image is well diffused into the ciphertext
image. Since DLEDNet has good diffusion performance and
is with highly sensitive to the plaintext, it achieves a good
performance to resist the chosen plaintext attack like the
differential attack.
4) Chosen Ciphertext Attack: In this type of attack, the
attacker can access the decryption device, choose a string of
ciphertext and construct its corresponding plaintext string.
Since the structure of our decryption model is exactly the
same as the encryption model, the experiment for chosen
ciphertext attack is similar to that in chosen plaintext attack.
In this experiment, the input of the decryption network is
the ciphertext image and the NPCR is used to calculate the
different between two decrypted images. According to the
experiment, it is found that when the input ciphertext image
changes slightly ( just 1% pixels changed), the average NPCR
value between two decrypted images is 94.87%. It means that
if the input ciphertext image changes slightly, the decrypted
image will change dramatically. This demonstrates that the
proposed algorithm has good diffusion performance and is also
highly sensitive to the ciphertext. It is effective to resist the
chosen ciphertext attack.
V. EXPERIMENT
A. Performance of Encryption and Decryption
As shown in Fig.9, the results of the proposed method
for medical image encryption and decryption are presented
in a visual way. It can be seen that the ciphertext image
generated by the encryption network G, is totally different
from the original medical image and the pathology information
cannot be observed. In addition, the image in the third row
is decrypted from the encrypted one through the decryption
network F, can recover the detailed information of the original
image and restore to the original one. In order to evaluate the
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Fig. 9. The encryption and decryption performance of the proposed method, in which, the images are original image, encryption image and decryption image
from the top to bottom, respectively.
effectiveness of the decryption network, the Peak Signal to
Noise Ratio (PSNR) and structural similarity index (SSIM)
are employed as evaluation metrics.
The quantitative measure of the decryption error is PSNR,
which is based on the root mean square error (RMSE) between
the decrypted data and ground truth. It can be represented as:
PSNR = 20log10
255
RMSE
(12)
To further evaluate the performance of encryption and decryp-
tion, the SSIM is used as another metric.
SSIM(x, y) = [l(x, y)]α[c(x, y)]β [s(x, y)]γ (13)
where l(x, y) is the brightness comparison, c(x, y) is the
contrast comparison, and s(x, y) is the structure comparison.
The closer the SSIM is to 1, the more resemblance the two
images are. And if this value approaches to 0, the two images
are completely different. In an ideal case, the SSIM between
the encrypted image and the original image is equal to 0, and
the SSIM between the decrypted image and the original image
is equal to 1. As shown in the second and third rows of Table
VI, the SSIM between the encrypted image and the original
image is close to 0, and the SSIM between the decrypted image
and the original image is close to 1.
For most of medical image processing tasks, the image can
be compressed to one-half size of the original one to reduce the
storage consumption and does not affect the doctor’s diagnosis.
In order to ensure that the decrypted image do not affect the
doctor’s diagnosis, the performance of the reconstructed image
decrypted by the decryption network, is also compared with
the one-half compressed image. According to the experiment,
it is demonstrated that the performance of the reconstructed
image is equivalent to that through directly compressing the
original image to half and then restoring it. In Table VI,
from line 3 to line 6, 2X means that the original image is
compressed to one-half and then restored. At this level, human
can accurately identify the patient’s organ contours and bone
information from reconstructed images.
B. Performance of ROI-Mining-Network
Direct extraction of interested information under ciphertext
conditions is of great significance for medical image secu-
rity and also for the data mining with privacy protection.
Fig. 10. The performance of ROI-Mining-Network.
The proposed ROI-mining-network can segment the patient’s
interested organ tissue from the ciphertext image without
decrypting the image firstly. The proposed network has the
ability to realize the data mining from the privacy environment
by extracting the ROI from the encrypted image directly. In
order to evaluate the proposed ROI-mining-network, the well-
known evaluation metric Dice score is adopted in here and is
defined as:
Dice(GT,AT ) =
GT ∩AT
(|GT |+ |AT |)/2 (14)
The GT represents the ground truth and the AT represents
the model predictions. Fig.10 shows the performance of the
proposed ROI-mining-network on the patient’s left lung. It can
be clearly seen that the prediction (grey ones) obtained from
the model is almost as the same as the ground truth (red ones).
In addition, the original medical images are also adopted as the
experiment data for training the same ROI-mining-network,
which is mainly used as the comparison. Under the same
training conditions, the DICE of the segmentation network
for plaintext is 0.967, while the DICE of the segmentation
network for the ciphertext image is 0.962. It can be proven
that the ROI-mining-network can achieve a good segmentation
performance on both plaintext and ciphertext images.
As mentioned before, the privacy keys of the network
are totally different when training the network at different
times even if all the conditions are the same. Therefore, the
attacker cannot obtain the same ROI-mining-network even
if employing the same ciphertext image for training. The
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TABLE VI
EVALUATION OF THE SSIM AND PSNR.
Image Id 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SSIM(Encrypted) 0.93 0.88 0.90 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.89
SSIM(Decrypted) 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
SSIM(2X) 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.89 0.91 0.88 0.90 0.91 0.90
PSNR 37.43 35.34 36.01 38.03 35.76 35.87 36.13 37.17 35.88 35.74
PSNR(2X) 35.48 35.74 35.03 35.28 34.87 36.73 34.75 34.61 36.17 34.80
Fig. 11. Attack experiment for the proposed ROI-Mining-Network.
experiment can be found in Fig.11. In this experiment, Fig.11
(a) is the original image and Fig.11 (b) is the ciphertext image
of Fig.11 (a). Fig.11 (c) is the ground truth for the right
lung segmentation. Fig.11 (d) is the correct extraction result
segmented by the ROI-mining-network. Fig.11 (e) is the error
extraction result segmented by the attacker.
C. Efficiency
To evaluate the efficiency of the proposed network, the run-
ning speed of encryption and decryption process on different
resolution medical images is evaluated. For 256*256 resolu-
tion, the proposed network can encrypt or decrypt 14.28 med-
ical images per second, while the speed is 3.65 images/second
for encrypting or decrypting 512*512 resolution image. This
encryption/decryption speed can basically meet the efficiency
requirement in clinical practice. In addition, some chaotic
encryption algorithms have been adopted as the comparison
method for evaluating the efficiency. For instance, Zhou et
al [32] introduce a simple chaotic system, which employs a
combination of two existing one-dimension (1D) chaotic maps
(seed maps). Liao et al [33] introduce a novel image encryption
algorithm based on self-adaptive wave transmission. Wu et
al [35] introduce a wheel-switch chaotic system for image
encryption. In [36], the two-dimensional logistic map with
complicated basin structures and attractors is firstly used for
image encryption. This method can encrypt an intelligible
image into a random-like one both from the point of view
of the statistical and the human visual system.
Fig. 12 shows the comparison among aforementioned five
chaotic encryption algorithms and the proposed method.
The FPS represents the number of images that can be en-
crypted/decrypted in one second. It can be found that our
methods achieve the fastest encryption speed both on 512×512
resolution and 256×256 resolution images. Although the num-
ber of keys in our method is greater than the number of keys
used in chaotic encryption methods, the processing time of
our method is still with higher efficiency.
Fig. 12. The efficiency comparison between our method and other existing
methods.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel medical image encryption and decryp-
tion method (namely DLEDNet) is proposed by leveraging
deep learning techniques, which is one of the early attempts
to adopt the concept of “deep learning” for medical image
encryption. The Cycle-GAN network is adopted as the learning
network to encrypt and decrypt the medical image. A target
domain is used to guide the learning model to realize the en-
cryption process. The reconstruction network can decrypt the
encrypted image to the original image (plaintext). Moreover,
a ROI-mining-network is proposed to directly extract the ROI
from the encrypted medical image, with which DLEDNet can
segment the interested organ or tissue in the ciphertext envi-
ronment without decrypting the medical image. We conduct
experiments on the chest X-ray datasets, the results show that
the proposed algorithm can protect the medical image with a
high security level and can encrypt/decrypt the image in a more
efficient way, compared with other state-of-the-art counterpart
medical image encryption methods.
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